Panel Five: Experiences Beyond the U.S. Army
The Soviet Media During the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989—Dr. Robert Baumann
The ICRC’s Approach in Terms of Philosophy, Planning and Execution of a Media Plan—Mr. Bernard Barrett
Please feel free to pose questions to the panelists. This post will be updated with content from the presentations.
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Background to Soviet media system:
ReplyDelete•Comprehensive, embracing all media.
•Centrally directed and paid to back official policy.
•Union card was a license to practice.
•Totally respectful of government penchant for secrecy and unreservedly dedicated to the propagation of good news about the regime.
•Not motivated by profit or the need for a prize-winning scoop.
•Anti-Soviet Propaganda laws in effect.
Media Trends:
ReplyDelete•Soviets were responding to call for help from ally.
•War just another front of imperialist anti-Soviet campaign waged by U.S. and China.
•No complexity; Ignore international disapproval and stay on the offensive.
•Never acknowledge domestic critics.
•No casualties, hence no acknowledgement of veterans.
•No video from the front.
•“Information vacuums tend to get filled and the Russian public had developed an informal apparatus to stay informed.”
ReplyDelete•A book was published that gave the official party line for intervention in Afghanistan. It was essentially an edited volume that included speeches and justification for the war.
•Soviets thought Olympic Games being held in Moscow justified the righteousness of their intervention in Afghanistan.
•“There was no stone left unturned in their attempt to block foreign criticism of the war.”
•Afghan President Hafizullah Amin said Afghans called for help from the Soviets to protect their revolution. Although, he was one of the first people taken out after the invasion. The Soviets labeled him a CIA agent.
•U.S. Olympic boycott was explosive, an affront to the Soviets. Many countries throughout the world joined the boycott. “The bottom line is it did spoil the party for the Soviets in a number of ways.”—Dr. Baumann
•1985: Gorbachev advances new engagement strategy that is based on openness.
•From 1984 to 1987, disapproval with the war grew from 25 percent to 45 percent.
Conclusions
ReplyDelete•Soviet STRATCOM could not sustain support for the war.
•Absent coercion, a vibrant anti-war movement would have blossomed by 1984.
•People filled informational vacuum themselves.
•Late war, a serious credibility gap emerged.
The ICRC’s Approach in Terms of Philosophy, Planning and Execution of a Media Plan—Mr. Bernard Barrett
ReplyDelete•ICRC founded in 1859.
•ICRC is not an international organization. It is a private Swiss organization with international standing. The ICRC does not engage in public fundraising. It protects and assists victims of conflict.
•ICRC prefers confidential communication with belligerents.
•ICRC depends on its acceptance by all parties in the conflict. It does not employ any kind of security.
•Public communication is used to address institutional priorities and issues. Usually, matters of concern are discussed including humanitarian issues.
•Reporters use ICRC as a “reality check” concerning official government numbers and situational briefs.
•ICRC prefers to speak about its actions, rather than what its representatives see in the field.